

# Failure of Conventional Security Measures in Management of Zamfara Un-Ending Conflict: The Need for Review of State Socio-Economic Policies

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**Abstract:** Since 2011 when the conflict between Fulani herdsmen and local farmers begin to escalate to a high level of human comprehension, there has been unending agitations on the need to review the effectiveness of the conventional security approaches in managing the conflict situation in Zamfara state. Though the conflict started like a mere domestic disagreement between Fulani herdsmen and farmers, the manners at which the state security apparatus have been handling the security situation influences the conflict to take multi-advance dimension especially with the recent cases of militia, kidnapping, abduction as well as banditry. As it is, the conflict in Zamfara has reached an advance stage that even the conventional security forces such as military, police and other critical security actors have suffered worst defeat from both sides of the divides. All indicators have shown that conventional security forces are incapable of containing the conflict situation in Zamfara as at now. The situation has also caused serious embarrassment for not only Zamfara but Nigeria as a whole hence it has added in to the security burden of the country. Many factors have been attributed to the failure of the conventional security approaches to the Zamfara conflict and as a result there has been a consensus that review of the state socio-economic and political policies is the only panacea to complimenting the current management of Zamfara conflict. This paper adopted the use of purposive interview techniques as the simplest methodology of data collection hence survivors, eye witnesses and victims of the conflict since 2011 constitute critical parts of the primary sources of the interview.

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## Introduction

One of the disturbing issues that gives Zamfara state people and government sleepless night since 2011 is the un-ending conflict that led to the death of hundreds of thousands of people at various remote and rural areas across the state. The conflict which started as mere ideological crises between some Fulani herders and local farmers around Dansadau forest later resurfaced to become a concern national issue and a big threat to national security of Nigeria.

Though when the conflict started, not many believed that, Zamfara state is battling with a dangerous security situation at hand, until in the middle of 2014 when hundreds of lives were lost to the murderous attacks on the people of Kizara in Tsafe and Yargaladima in Maru local government areas of the state Shafiu (2018). In the two most popular attacks, over three hundred lives were lost and scores of people were critically injured Mamman (2018). Even with the unusual casualties recorded in these and many other attacks after them, government still believed the security situation can be managed using the conventional security approach but instead of the conflict situation to be brought to an end the matter escalated and takes multi-advance dimension.

After the 2015 general elections, the conflict takes another dimension especially when every community in Zamfara state become a target of attack by these suspected bandits. From April to October 2015, and estimate of sixty eight different attacks were launched with casualty figures reading almost around one thousand two hundred people Munnir (2018). By early 2016, it becomes apparent that, the conflict is no longer farmers-herders clash but an act of banditry and militia hence the bandits organized themselves and form a strong network which gives them the confidence to confront even the conventional security personals with our fear. Lawal (2018) argued, after the 2015 elections these hoodlums formed an organized network under the headship of one Buhari Tsoho and continue to launch murderous attacks killing anybody sighted during an attack. It takes a point that, their interest is to attack communities and killed people inhumanly.

In the middle of the year 2017 however, the conflict moved to an advance level of human kidnapping and abduction hence hundreds of people across all parts of Zamfara state have been kidnapped and abducted for ransom. Bala (2018) argued, today Zamfara people are not scared of attacks hence majority of us in the rural areas have become vigilante members and we knew fully it is risk for us to sleep at home in the night so we move to the forest with our family members and unite in the morning. But the most dangerous dimension to this conflict is the kidnapping and abduction hence majority of us in spites of the poverty that is inching deep inside us we were forced by these bandits to raise money and pay ransom.

This development has been attributed to the failure of the conventional security measures adopted by both the federal and state government in managing this conflict situation. As argued by Nuhu (2018), sincerely military and police men are critical parts of the management of the security situation in Zamfara but in actual sense they do not have the capacity to manage the problem hence, the bandits are well armed with modern and dangerous weapons, and they operate as network and they have understand the terrain more than the conventional security men. Also the number of the security personals in evidently in adequate hence these people come in hundreds and well prepared.

Alternatively however, there are those with the popular views that, no matter the number and capacity or the strengths of the equipments used by the Nigerian security personals, managing this type of conflict situation requires holistic review of the state socio-economic policies as they relates poverty eradication, employment opportunities, enhancement of job creation through skills acquisition programmes, citizens empowerment through soft loans to boost small and medium enterprises as well as reconstruction and rehabilitation of the victims and communities involved in the tragedy since 2011.

The objective of this paper is to among many other things, assess the impacts of the intervention of the conventional security approach in the management of Zamfara conflict as

well as assess whether or not the state socio-economic policies needs to be reviewed to address the socio-economic needs of the people. The paper would adopt mixed methodology of literature review and purposive field interview techniques hence victims, survivors and eye witnesses would be interviewed to give an account of the situation as it affects their various localities.

### Zamfara Conflict: An Over-view

As highlighted earlier in the introduction, the origin of Zamfara conflict could be traced to the brutal murder of a suspected Fulani herder at Chile market by some members of organized vigilante group as reprisal attack in 2011. Though it was one action against an accused, the implication of what happened at Chile sent a wrong signal to other organized vigilante groups along Dansadau forest and several other places who resorted to applying similar strategy of killing any suspected Fulani herder who is on their track list. Jabir (2018) argued, when the Fulani men were openly murdered in an open market at Chile the government and indeed the security agencies failed to take appropriate steps of managing the new development until when it become an order of the day. Every day you had that, some suspected Fulani herder is arrested in a weekly market and killed gruesomely by the members of the organized vigilante group. This situation become tensed with the murder of about twenty five Fulani herders at Dangulbi, Dankurmi, Nasarawar Godal and Kasuwar Daji markets from 2011 to 2015.

Since the incident at Chile the security situation along Dansadau forest and other critical areas of Zamfara state changes dramatically with the series of attacks launched in more than one hundred communities in Zamfara state. Lawal (2018) argued, since when the conflict started in 2011, over one hundred communities and settlements have been either invaded or attacked by the suspected bandits and hundreds of lives and properties have been lost to this tragedy.

**Table 1. Some Graphic Pictures of Areas Affected by the Zamfara Conflict Since 2011**

S/No		Incident	Casualties
1	February 14 <sup>th</sup> 2018	Attack on Villagers travelling on Truck to Birane Village	41 people Killed
2	January 18 <sup>th</sup> 2018	Gun men attack Gora Village in Maradun	6 People Killed, Four wounded and 2 sons of a Federal Legislator abducted
3	September 22 <sup>nd</sup> 2017	Gun men attack Tsafe Town	An official of FRSC Killed
4	January 26 <sup>th</sup> 2017	Suspected herdsmen killed one person in Magazu in an attempt to find one Rabo who allegedly stole their Cattle	One Person killed
5	November 19 <sup>th</sup> 2016	Gun men attacked Dole, Tudun Bugaje and Kwangami Villages in Zurmi	25 People Killed
6	November 18 <sup>th</sup> 2016	Gunmen Rustle Cattle and abducted people in Maru Local Government	40 People Abducted
7	November 7 <sup>th</sup> 2016	Gun men Killed Gold Miners at a mining Camp near Gidan Ardo Village in Maru	40 Gold Miners Killed

8	November 6 <sup>th</sup> 2016	Gun men killed Ten traders from Kanoma Village in Maru Local Government Council	10 people killed
9	May 5 <sup>th</sup> 2016	Gun men invaded Madada Village RuwanTofa	Number of Casualties not confirmed.
10	February 6 <sup>th</sup> 2016	Gun men attacked Kwanar Dutse Village in Maru Local government Council	50 people killed, Cattle stole and houses burnt
11	July 2015	Gun men attacked Kokeya and Chigama	Over 30 people killed and hundreds of cattle rustle
12	September 2014	Gun Men Killed people at Akuzo, Zarfarawa, Girke, Kofa, Kundubau, Wonaka, Fura Girke, FeginMahe, Kukar Gwandu, Kanawa Lafiya and Gora Villages	33 People were killed
13	April 6 <sup>th</sup> 2014	Suspected Gun Men attacked Yargaladima Village of Maru Local government Council	200 People were killed
14	September 30 <sup>th</sup> 2013	Gun men attacked Buzuzu Village in Bukkuyum Local government Council	3 People were Killed
15	July-September 2013	Summary of people killed and abducted as stated by the State Governor	160 people killed and 10 married women abducted
16	June 18 <sup>th</sup> 2013	Gun Men attacked Kizara Village In Tsafe	48 People were killed
17	December 14 <sup>th</sup> 2012	Gun men attacked Rukudawa Village in Zurmi Local government Council	10 members of vigilante o Vigilante were shot dead
18	October 30 <sup>th</sup> 2012	Gunmen attacked Kaboro Village in DansadauMaru Local government Council	20 people including the Village Head were killed
19	June 11 <sup>th</sup> 2012	Gunmen attacked Guru, Dangulbi Sabuwar Kasuwa and Biya Village all in Maru Local government Council	26 people killed
20	May 12 <sup>th</sup> 2012	Robbers attacked Jangeme Village	Killed four Police men and 2 Children
21	October 3 <sup>rd</sup> 2011	Gun men attacked Lingyado Village in Maru Local government Council	23 people killed

Sources: Reuters, NTA, BBC, Premium Times, Daily Trust, Leadership, Vanguard, The Street Journal, The Scoop, Nigerian Tribune, Fox News, Africa Review, Information Nigeria, Channels Tv, PM News (2018).

The consequences of the conflict have not only resulted to loss of lives and properties, but it affected almost virtually all aspect of the socio-economic and political development of the state. It has influenced forceful migration of hundreds of Fulani herders with their cattle and other livestock out of Zamfara due to the fear of the unknown. Tukur (2014) argued, Zamfara has loss over one hundred Fulani settlements to this conflict even as over one fourty two thousand herds of cattle have been moved out of the state. The implication of the exit of the Fulani and their cattle out of Zamfara led to scarcity of cattle and increase in the price meat in the market. Muhammad (2018) argued, the price at which we normally buy cattle and slaughter for sales in the market has almost doubled instead of going to Talatar-Mafara, Shinkafi or Gummi markets to secure cattle at a cheaper and affordable prices, one has to travel as per as Adamawa and Niger states to procure them. Imagine what it will take someone to procure and transport cattle from this per distance to Zamfara and sales meat to the people.

The crises also lead to the increasing hunger and shortage of food as majority of those affected are rural people whose pre-occupation is mainly farming. Since 2014, the victim communities have been voicing out their fear that, the bandits have been threatening their effort to embark on their annual farming activities as many were shot dead by the bandits on their farms. Wadatau (2018) argued, eighty percent of farmers at Dagulbi, Dankurmi and their neighboring villages could not farm their lands for the past five consecutive years because they have been sent warning notice and some of those who defy the warning were killed by these bandits. The development caused not only shortage of food but increasing hunger among people as hardly people find food of nutritional value to eat. Our people are dying of hunger as both the government and wealthy individuals in the cities have left us at our own faith, Umar (2018).

Health care management has almost become paralyzed hence the medical health facilities have been abandoned by the professional health personals because of their safety. Lawal (2018) argued, as I speak to you, if you exclude General Hospital Dansadau and Dangulbi, our people have to travel to Gusau or nearby local government to access medical help as no health worker is willing to risk his life and stay with us in the villages. Our pregnant women die of absence of basic primary health care support caused by the unending tragedy that befalls us.

Not only health care system, education had also suffered hence majority of the schools that were either constructed or renovated by the government have been abandoned by the teachers. Even where the teachers opted to stay some of the pupils are not able to pay the schools because their breadwinners were either killed or incapacitated by the deadliest attacks of these bandits, Mammam (2015) argued, when attack in Yargaladima was perfected we had to shut down our only primary school in the village hence those that are providing the primary financial support to be paying salaries to teachers were all killed in the attack. We used to contribute three hundred naira per child to raise fourty five thousand naira as salary to the three NCE teachers we employed to teach our children and among us there are those with three-five children and majority of them are killed and even before the attack, government constructed two blocks of six class rooms and for the past three years we had been agitating for deployment of teachers but that has failed. And now that over one hundred households are killed to the most tragic attack in our community we had to shut down the school completely. Added to this negative development recorded for the past seven years is the emergence of human kidnapping and abduction that befall almost every parts of the state. Since the beginning of the year 2018, the attention of every citizen of Zamfara has been shifted to the

menace of human abduction and kidnapping. Munnir (2018) argued, if there is any calamity that this tragedy of banditry has caused Zamfara people is the proliferation of armed banditry and human kidnapping as over two hundred people are either abducted or kidnapped for ransom. Here in Kaura Namoda it has become a daily thing hardly a day comes since February 2018 without one or two person being kidnapped and millions of naira is being demanded as ransom.

### **Security Measures Deployed by the Government**

Since when the conflict started in 2011, conventional security measures have been adopted by both the police, military and officials of the State Security Services to help end the security situation. These measures have however, yielded little impacts hence the situation is still alive in Zamfara and instead of reducing is taking an advance dimension. Balarabe (2018) argued, In the late 2013 for instance when the attack was launched in Lingyado community where twenty seven people were killed, we does not have up to three police men in the community and the number of the invaders was over sixty and they come with deadly weapons and funny enough the only police man on duty that night do not have even a den gun in his possession gun so he has to run away and scamper for safety of his life. They twenty seven people vandalized the whole Lingyado community and went away. The next day government deployed mobile police officers to patrol the area up to Magami and three days after the incident, they mobile police officers were withdrawn and fear grievied all of us again hence we are left at our own mercy.

The same scenario happened when people of Kango community were attacked. Ashiru (2018) argued, when the bandits come to the Kango village around 2:00am majority of us were at sleep and the sound of the gun-shots left everybody in the village panicking as they succeeded in killing seventeen people and severely wounded twenty three other people and some of us who were lucky to escape knew very well that, our safety is in our hand. In the whole of Kango village as at the time of that attack we had only one police officer managing the police outpost and we could not have access to the other advance security formations. Two days after the incident, police were deployed to conduct surveillance of the area but in less than a week they were withdrawn. We have to form a strong vigilante group comprising every household in the community to defend ourselves.

Two days to the merciless attack in Kizara which left over fourty people dead, report had it that, security personal especially police were adequately informed about the possibility of the attack hence the bandits have sent a signal letter but even with the security beefed up, they attacked Kizara community, destroyed the larger parts of it and forced to people to embarked on un-intentional migration Kabiru (2014). In another account, when they come in the broad day light the police confronted them but minutes of exchange of gun-shots they over-powered the police because their weapons are heavily modern and they brutally killed our family and relations Danmaliki (2014). The senator representing Zamfara central Kabiru Garba Marafa argued, that, withdrawal of the mobile police on surveillance along Kizara forest by the then Police Commissioner Akila Usman Gwary led to the murderous attacks and hence the CP argued that, the withdrawal was based on the instruction from the top police hierarchy in Abuja.

The attack on Yargaladima also influenced a heavy decision which led to the conduct of an extended state security meetings with all the Emirs, Head of Security Agencies in the state as well concern citizens and after the meeting adequate number of military personal have been deployed and stationed along the area, but that has not yielded the much needed result hence,

less than a month after the Yargaladima attack I can count over ten different attacks that took place along the Dansadau forest. There was an attack in Bindin, there is another one in two different communities around Kurar Mota and Kango and I knew about another one in three communities around Dangulbi Basiru (2018).

Precisely between 2015 and late 2017, there are over one thousand military personals that were deployed to Zamfara state for special operation against these bandits, but the situation keep rising to the very level that people doubt the capacity of the conventional security operatives to manage the situation. Basiru (2018) argued, there was a time Dansadau axis of Zamfara state was turned to almost like battle training ground, you see military personal in their hundreds patrolling the area and even making some arrests but their presence has not change anything hence people along this our area are sleeping with endless fear. Muhammad (2018) argued. We have seen and heard about series of state security meetings which the governor chaired and decisions to deploy more and more and more number of military and police have been taken but the presence of these security personals has not eliminated the fear in the people of Zamfara state. This means that the state security architecture is weak and ineffective in tackling the conflict at hand.

Added to these measures Federal government through the ministry of defense, has set a whole military battalion in Zamfara and also established Air force military wing and presently there are over thousand military officers with vehicles and weapons but the situation has not being successfully brought under control.

Disarmament committee was also set up by the government under the headship of late Shiekh Tureta to among other things tour the whole seventeen emirates and meet with critical stakeholders on how to address the conflict. The committee met with the suspected bandits in the forest their grievances were heard and recommendation were provided appropriately and the findings were very wonderful but we cannot say what is actually the reason for not implementing the recommendations Gulluba (2017). Not only that, the state government initiated a peace deal with the bandits through the state Deputy Governor aimed at intimidating the bandits to surrender and embrace peace. The peace deal is the most effective measures many of the citizens of Zamfara thought would help bring an end to the conflict situation in the state but shortly after the peace deal was executed fresh violence emerged and the situation becomes more tensed ever than before Shuaibu (2018).

The community vigilante strategy has also not yielded much needed result hence they have instead of succeeding in supporting the conventional fight against the banditry become integral parts of the problem. As argued by Aminu (2018), if to say the state government has coordinated the operation of the community vigilante very well they may be useful to the army and police hence they understand their own terrain very well and they can pointedly provide basic information on who the real target of the security operatives may be. In Maiduguri because of the coordination they Yansakai (Security Volunteers) supported the military operation adequately their impacts was positively felt. In Zamfara in the views of Shuaibu (2018) the vigilante groups have been black mailed as being parts of the problem hence they embarked on executing jungle justice on suspected bandits without recourse to the status of the constitutional authorities.

### **Why the Conventional Measures failed**

There have been conflicting views as to why the conventional security measures taken to manage the conflict in Zamfara have failed. Some saw the failure as the deliberate action of

the government while others look at it from multi-dynamic perspectives. But in actual sense, the most popular views is that, the state security architecture is both weak and in-effective especially with the political precedents that characterized the attitude of the Governor toward the security situation of the state. Abdullahi (2018) argued, one of the reasons why this conflict could not end as anticipated is because the Governor has failed to accept the peculiarity of the problem and stay in his state to take drastic measures that will bring an end to the problem. Not only this reason, the unnecessary out-of the state trips embarked by the Governor even during this emergency situation show his lack of serious concern for ending the problem. Munnir (2018) argued, when dozens of communities are being under siege by the bandits, when hundreds are people are being under abduction when hundreds of people are being gruesomely murdered, the Governor has never stay in the state for even twenty four hours and not until recently he does not develop the culture of visiting communities affected and show his concern.

Another concern that related to the attitude of the Governor is his rigidity to accepting professional briefings from the heads of the security agencies in the state. He always made statements that are in contradictions with the real security situation in the state. To justify this claim the former Commissioner of Police for Zamfara state Akila Usman Gwary said, “when the attack in Kizara was launched in 2014 for instance, the Governor was far away in the Ukraine and we the heads of the security agencies in the state could not get access to brief him and on return to the country we were only given an instruction to drive to Aviation air strip in Zaria to wait for the Governor and proceed to Kizara. On arrival the Governor did not call for our briefing neither did he allow for a brief meeting we proceeded straight to Kizara where he made the statement that, he had procured weapons for distribution to community vigilante for self-defense, this is very wrong statement in a tensed situation we have at hand”, NTA (2014).

The strategic nature of the forest is also another critical factor while the conventional approach to Zamfara conflict has failed. The forest is vast, thick and diversionary with multiplicity of routes and exits and the conventional police officers and military deployed to go after these bandits does not understand the terrain of the forest and therefore found it very difficult to succeed. Bello (2018) Dansadau-Birning Gwary forest is very strategic not even some us who were born and brought up here can tell you it’s actual dimension and these hoodlums because there are Fulani in their midst and they have been here for decades they can easily launched attack and exit to another uncertain location of it.

In another account, former Zamfara state Commissioner of Police Tambari Yabo Muhammad declared “you can penetrate any parts of Zamfara through Dansadau Birnin Gwary forest and my officers and men found it very difficult to trace the actual location of the bandits because they have more than fifty exit routes and my men does not understand the working of the terrain in the forest.

Secondly, even where the location of the bandits could be traced sometimes the terrain is not motor able hence there is no good access road where police men or military could drive with their hilux and get these bandits arrested. CP Gwary once argued, when they attacked Dumburum and Rukudawa villages in Kaura-Namoda axis of the state I have quickly deployed my men to the scene they succeeded in chasing these people but where they headed in the forest, our police vehicles could not access the places because of the non-motorability of the area and even where my men wanted to use motorcycles the community people are not willing to sacrifice their lives and drives my men to the place. So they have easy exit NTA

(2014). Adding in to this opinion, the Military commandant for Zamfara Colonel Victor once told journalists that, there was a time my men pursue these bandits across Ajja forest in Birnin Magaji and toward intercepting them they crossed through the river and hides and when my men arrived they could not cross the river with their vehicles and before they decided on what to do they fired at my men and killed five of them.

Other arguments as to why the conventional security measures failed in Zamfara is the absence of good and effective communication network along the forest. Sometimes the villagers may be aware of the coming of the bandits but before they can be able to communicate effectively to the security agencies or relevant government authorities the bad thing had happened. CP Gwary once argued, these people could not communicate effectively even before the attacks are launched and even when information reach the security agencies my men found it difficult to arrive in time or even explain the situation of things in case there is need for re-enforcement NTA (2014).

Scattered nature of the settlement is also another reason hence the communities and settlements are scattered across the entire forest and sometimes you don't even heard of the name of a community till an attack is launched. CP Gwary once said, there are over five hundred scattered settlements across Dansadau forest and looking at the human resource strengths of the Nigerian Police Force you do not expect the state police command to send police officers to all these settlements and because these people are scattered it give the bandits the needed opportunities to invade these communities easily and at any point in time they can take police by surprise.

The political dimension of the conflict is also another reason why the conventional security strategies could not succeed. While the Governor attributed the failure to the inability of the Federal Government to decisively deal with the situation others believed that this position canvassed by the Governor is no more than mere demonstration of his weaknesses to accept the blame and chat the way forward for sustainable security of the state. The Governor in a recent state security meeting held at the State Government house Gusau declared " I am looking at the option of resigning as the Chief Security Officer of the state hence the security chiefs are not willing to take command from me and even where they are informed of a plan attack they hardly respond at the appropriate time". But beyond this game of blame there are those that, are of the views that, the Governor should have not capitalized on that reason to allow the control of his state security architecture. Senator Kabiru Marafa once said " the Governor is not concern about the security situation of Zamfara hence he has relocated in Abuja and even where he was informed of an attack he only go to the capital city of the state gathered those that matters at the state government house make ceremonial speeches and go. Same day another attack would happened NTA (2018). This is one out of many agitations by concern citizens that, the Governor is playing politics with the security situation of the state. Jalaudeen (2018) argued, while the Governor was busy condoling the people and government of Plateau state over the recent crises, two of his communities have been attacked and over twenty people have been killed.

Lack of coordination among the security agencies is also another factor especially when things go out of hand neither the Police, Military or officials of the State Security Services are willing to take blame. On several occasions, especially when communities blamed security agencies for not acting promptly even when notice are served on them they always resorted to embarking on game of blame. When Birane Community in Zurmi was attacked three months back, the Emir of Zurmi Alh Atiku Abubakar insisted that, there was effective

communication between his emirate and security agencies on the possibility of the attack but they have not done the needful and the unwanted terrible situation emerged Kaulahi (2018)

### **State Socio-Economic Measure: The Need for Review**

World over, it has been a consensus position that conflict could not be managed through the use of conventional measures alone. And while the government is stringent on using the military and police to manage the existing conflict situation it has to also devise the means of reviewing its basic socio-economic policies as they are connecting to the citizen's way of life. As argued by Lanre (2013) social and economic stability are the basis for peace in any society.

Contrary to how many people in the government cycle including the State Governor perceived the situation at hand it is an open facts that the security situation becomes out of hand simply because the social and economic order in the state is either obsolete or ineffective in addressing the fundamental needs of Zamfara people.

Looking at the status of agriculture in Zamfara state for instance, it is apparent that, the current administration has done little to revive agriculture to make it conform with timely need of the people. The conflict in Zamfara has so far sent over two thousand capable farmers out of farms even as hundreds of hectares of farm lands are abandoned due to warnings and threats by the bandits. Bashiru (2018) argued, the state government is not doing anything to make our land secured for us farm and produce sufficient food for our family, and an alternative farming mechanism has not provided for us now majority of us are dying in hunger, as vast as dansadau forest with over one hundred and fifty thousand of fertile and arable land has been abandoned to the faiths of the bandits. The government need to embark on policy review around agriculture and boost the morale of the farmers to produce more food. In the other view, Adamu (2018) argued, I have been in to the business of grain selling in Gusau for over twenty two years and believed me there is a big problem with food security in the state hence majority of the food stock you are seeing here was imported out of the state, farmers in Zamfara have exited their farms except very few due to insecurity and we are paying for the price. Tukur (2018) argued, the Governor need to revert back to the old system of agricultural development of the state (ZACAREP) or else hunger would spread across the state.

Another social policy that Zamfara state government need to review is the policy of youth empowerment especially the abandoned Skills Acquisition Programme which was initiated by Governor Sani Yarima. When de-empower your talented youth and make them ineffective you should not expect peace. Nobody is happy with the Governor for his deliberate failure to revive and sustained the popular Skills Acquisition Programme of his predecessor. The government should engage its youths and provide small grants for them to start businesses after they are trained. This would help in reducing the chances of getting majority of them getting themselves involve in crime and criminal activities. Sharing her experiences, Shafa (2018) stated that, there many of those we work together at the Gusau Skills Acquisition Center and before their engagement for Skills training they were almost loss to thuggery and drunkenness but today some of them are rehabilitated and they are usefully contributing to the economic development of the state.

State policies on education need to also be reviewed to accommodate children of the poor and lee-privilege because even where structures for schools are provided if the system is costly for the common people and their children, chances of having more educated people in the

state is very low. Muhsin (2018) argued, the best way for the state is to implement the primary and secondary school education assessment committee report so that those critical issues that can enhance education could be implemented. In another perspectives, there are those who are of the views that, state policies on education needs to be redirected toward institutionalizing state of emergency in education so that citizens can tap from the wealth of investment on education. Haruna (2018) argued, if you look at the national indices on education Zamfara is the most backward state and our performance even in WAEC and NECO will tell you the level of predicament we are undergoing and the state government need to understand that, priority to educating our young people is the greatest investment that is more important than buying hilux and patrol vehicles to military and police. An educated society always enjoys relative stability and low rate of crime and criminality.

Again, review of the educational policy shall also include total overhauling of nomadic education especially with the current scenario where by Fulani who had settled in Zamfara for decades have been forced to move out of Zamfara due to the security challenges facing the state. Indicators have shown that, nomadic education have suffered the worst during this crises period hence sixty percent of the structures set up for nomadic education have been abandoned by the beneficiaries. Kabiru (2018) argued, I am one of the teachers of nomadic school in Maradun and as at present we have to close down the facility temporarily hence the nomad children have decided to fled the state with their parent and now we are on our own.

Policy on Livestock development is also another area of concern for review especially with the mass exodus of Fulani herders out of Zamfara state. Estimate has shown that, from 2009 to 2017 Zamfara state has loss over fifty thousand herds of cattle to this conflict. The forceful migration of the Fulani herders may not be unconnected with the diminishing status of grazing reserves as well as cattle routes. As argued by Babuga (2018), Zamfara state government is reluctant in addressing the plights of the farmers, large quantity of our grazing reserves have been forcefully taken away from us and some of the existing dams where we used to go for watering of our livestock have now extinct and from left right and center the state government deliberately want to frustrate livestock development. In another development many people are of the opinion that hence the government has not accorded significant attention to livestock development through efficient budgetary provisions and releases, people may not put much hope on the revival of the sub-sector. Sanusi (2018) argued, if you look at the fiscal budget of the state, and allocation to livestock sub-sector you will find out that, the state does not have passion for livestock development especially looking at the way releases are not made for the past seven years. Our veterinary clinics are not functioning and to sum it all the state does not have perfect agenda for livestock development.

Poverty alleviation programme is also another fundamental and important policy of the state that needs to be reviewed to address the existing conflict. It has been established that Zamfara is one of the poorest states in the country whose citizens suffered the worst form socio-economic instability Munnir (2018). The government in actual sense Zamfara has lost a sense of direction especially with low level of concern developing sectors that would help in reducing poverty to the barest minimum. People are dying of hunger and communities that suffered from these murderous attacks are left helplessly hence government has not developed any strategy that would enhance the micro-economy of these rural communities. As argued by Sule (2018), state government need to conduct a state baseline survey to ascertain the level at which poverty is biting people very harder in Zamfara state. the reality of the situation is that, majority which are about seventy percent of people in rural areas

especially those residing in the crises based areas of the state could not go to farm to produce food to eat and to say the worst they are the worst affected in terms of joblessness. Until government is ready to act faster and address the problem the poverty level will push many jobless people in the rural areas into crimes and criminal activities Mansur (2018).

Reconstruction of the victim communities is also another strategic policy which the government needs to take very seriously. Many are of the views that, the government has not been sincere to the victim communities' especially with the inhuman nature at which they were destroyed by this banditry since 2011. Estimate has shown that, over sixty five communities are directly affected by this act of banditry with properties valued at about 2.76 billion naira destroyed Mansur (2018). The expectations of the people is that, the government would embark on massive reconstruction of the communities affected by this act of banditry, many households have been rendered homeless with some families who lost their settlement to this tragedy forcefully neglected by the government. The inability of the government to respond to this timely need of reconstructing these communities the way the Borno state government has done would no doubt send doom to the nation's ability to manage this conflict.

Rehabilitation of the survivors and victims of the banditry is also another policy the state government needs to reconsider. Unconfirmed data have it that, more than one thousand five hundred and sixty eight people suffered various forms of injury and trauma as a result of this conflict and that hundreds of families also suffered neglect and isolation especially those that lost their bread winners and as a matter of humanitarian consideration, the state government in collaboration with other concerned individuals needs to come up with strategies of integrating these people into the society. Muazu (2018) argued, the state government since when this scenario started has not done much to consider the plight of the victims of this banditry and that many have been subjected to psychological trauma.

### Conclusion

From the discussion so far, it is evident that, the conventional security approaches applied in addressing the un-ending conflict in Zamfara is obviously as a result of neglecting the component of socio-economic policy review which are critical components of conflict management. The discussion has also succeeded in establishing the internal weaknesses of the conventional security architecture of the state especially with the new dimension the conflict has taken in Zamfara recently. The government needs to as a matter of urgency devise the means of integrating the other strategic component of the conflict management for success.

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